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In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City,' the U.S. Supreme Court held that a regulatory takings claim
against a local government is not ripe until the property owner has sought, and
been denied, compensation in state court.2 This state litigation requirement has
created a dilemma for plaintiffs who believe their property has been taken by
local regulation. If the aggrieved property owners sue in federal court, their
lawsuits are subject to being dismissed as unripe. 3 If the aggrieved property
owners sue in state court and lose, their claims are then barred from adjudication
in federal court under the doctrine of claim or issue preclusion. 4 Thus, unlike
plaintiffs pursuing any other constitutional right, federal takings claimants are
effectively denied a federal forum, save in the unique circumstance in which the
Supreme Court grants a petition for certiorari.'

Associate Professor, Norman Adrian Wiggins School of Law, Campbell University. Thanks
to Zac Bolitho and Brannon Denning for their useful comments on earlier drafts.
1. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
2.
Id. at 194 97 (citations omitted).
3.
See, e.g., N. Va. Law Sch., Inc. v. City of Alexandria, 680 F. Supp. 222, 224 25 (E.D.
Va. 1988) (citations omitted) (dismissing the plaintiffs takings claim as unripe for failure to
exhaust state remedies).
4.
See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City of S.F., 545 U.S. 323, 337-38 (2005) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738; England v. La. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411 (1964)) (holding that takings claims
litigated in state court have preclusive effect in federal court).
5. See John J. Delaney & Duane J. Desiderio, Who Will Clean Up the "Ripeness Mess "? A
CallFor Reform So Takings Plaintiffs Can Enter the FederalCourthouse, 31 URB. LAW. 195, 196
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Making matters worse is the decision in City of Chicago v. International
College of Surgeons,6 in which the Supreme Court held that a federal takings
claim filed in state court can be removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C. §
1441.
Reading International College of Surgeons and Williamson County
together leads to the anomalous result that a defendant can choose a federal
forum for regulatory takings cases, while a plaintiff cannot. Stranger still are
those cases in which the municipal defendant removes a takings case to federal
court, only to ask the court to dismiss the case because the plaintiff failed to
ripen the claim in the state court proceeding.9 The "ripeness trap" created by
these rules has led to a large amount of procedural gamesmanship, confusion,
and consternation for litigants and commentators alike.
During the summer of 2013, however, the Fourth Circuit decided two cases
that weaken the trap considerably and help bring some "normalization" to the
area of takings litigation. 10 First, the court held in Sansotta v. Town of Nags
Head" that a defendant waives the state litigation requirement by removing a
takings case to federal court.12 Second, the court indicated in Town of Nags
Head v. Toloczkol3 that it would refuse to apply the rule, even under
circumstances in which the plaintiff chose the federal forum, when doing so
would promote the interests of fairness and judicial economy.14
This Essay discusses these recent Fourth Circuit opinions, as well as the
larger legal backdrop of which they are a part, in the following manner. Part II
provides an overview of the relevant Supreme Court decisions that created the
ripeness trap and how lower courts have employed those decisions. Part III then
focuses on the Fourth Circuit's recent weakening of the trap, describing its
holdings and rationales in Sansotta and Toloczko. Part IV analyzes these
decisions, emphasizing two broader implications suggested by them. First, the

(1999) (noting that ripeness rules "have uniquely denied property owners, unlike the bearers of
other constitutional rights, access to the federal courts on their federal claims"); Gregory M. Stein,
Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in the FederalCourts, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1, 22 (1995) ("The state
compensation portion of this decision finds no parallel in the ripeness cases from other areas of the
law.").
6.
522 U.S. 156 (1977).
7.
Id. at 163-66 (citations omitted).
8.
See id. (citations omitted); Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 194 97 (citations omitted).
9.
See, e.g., Snaza v. City of St. Paul, 548 F.3d 1178, 1182 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Koscielski
v. City of Minneapolis, 435 F.3d 898, 903 (8th Cir. 2006)) (affirming dismissal of a takings claim as
unripe even though defendant removed case to federal court).
10. See Town of Nags Head v. Toloczko, 728 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2013); Sansotta v. Town of
Nags Head, 724 F.3d 533 (4th Cir. 2013). The word normalization is borrowed from Professor
Michael McConnell's discussion of a recent Supreme Court decision on a related issue. See
Michael W. McConnell, Home and the Normalization of Takings Litigation: A Response to
ProfessorEcheverria,43 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10749, 10749 (2013).
11. 724F.3d533.
12. Id. at 549.
13. 728F.3d391.
14. Id. at 399 (citing Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 545; San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City of S.F., 545
U.S. 323, 346 (2005)).
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Fourth Circuit's approach facilitates an understanding of the real basis for the
state litigation requirement, which has more to do with abstention than ripeness
principles. Second, these decisions implicitly question the rationale for treating
takings claims differently than alleged violations of other constitutional rights.
A brief conclusion follows in Part V.
II.

THE LEGAL BACKDROP

The ripeness trap finds its genesis in Williamson County.1 5 The plaintiff in
Williamson County filed suit in federal district court, alleging that the application
of local land use regulations resulted in a taking of its property without just
compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 16 The district court entered
judgment in favor of the local government, a decision which the Sixth Circuit
later overturned.1
The county petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari, asserting that a government regulation could never result in a taking
under the Fifth Amendment, although it could potentially violate the Due
Process Clause.18 The Court declined to address that question, however, because
it found that the plaintiffs claim was premature under either constitutional
. *
19
provision.
For purposes of the Takings Clause, the Court held that the claim was unripe
for two independent reasons.20 First, the Court explained that a takings claim "is
not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations
has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the
property at issue."21 Because the plaintiff had not sought a variance from the
22
regulations in question, this prong of the ripeness requirement was unsatisfied.
Second, and more significant for purposes of this Essay, the Court concluded
that the plaintiffs claim was not ripe because it had not sought "compensation
through the procedures the State ha[d] provided for doing so." 23
The requirement that compensation first be pursued from the state, the Court
explained, is derived from the fact that the Fifth Amendment prohibits only an
uncompensated taking, and not the taking itself.24 The Court suggested that if
the government provides an adequate mechanism for obtaining compensation
and such compensation is ultimately paid, then no constitutional violation has

15. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
16. Id. at 182.
17. Id. at 183 (citing Hamilton Bank of Johnson City v. Williamson Cnty. Reg'1 Planning
Comm'n, 729 F.2d 402, 409 (6th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 172 (1985)).
18. Id. at 185.
19. Id.
20. See id. at 186 94 (citations omitted).
21. Id. at 186.
22. Id. at 188.
23. Id. at 194.
24. Id. (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 297
n.40 (1981)).
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25

occurred.
Because the plaintiff was able to pursue compensation for the
alleged taking through an inverse condemnation action in state court, its taking
claim was "premature" until it utilized the state procedure and compensation was
denied.26
Williamson County requires that a federal takings plaintiff seek
compensation in state court and lose before the claim under the Takings Clause
ripens.27 Notably, the language employed by the Court in Williamson County
suggests that, once the state litigation concludes, the unsuccessful property
owner would then be allowed to pursue the now-mature claim in a federal
forum.28 In practice, however, that prospect has proved illusory. Within only a
few years after Williamson County, several lower courts held that a subsequent
relitigation of the takings claim in federal court was barred by res judicata,
collateral estoppel, and the federal full faith and credit statute 29a proposition
30
with which the Supreme Court has since agreed.
Williamson County and its progeny thus set a trap that relegates a federal
takings claim to state court.31 If a plaintiff files a claim in federal court, it will
be dismissed as unripe. 32 If the plaintiff ripens the claim by filing suit in state
court and loses, the state litigation will be given preclusive effect.33 In this area
of the law, as explained by some commentators, "the very act of 'ripening' a
case also ends it." 4

25. See id. at 194-95 (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1013, 1018 n.21,
1016-20 (1984)).
26. Id. at 196 97.
27. See id. at 194 97 (citations omitted).
28. See id.; see also Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Shell Game! You Can't Get There
From Here: Supreme Court Ripeness Jurisprudencein Takings Cases at Long Last Reaches the Selfparody Stage, 36 URB. LAW. 671, 684-85 (2004) ("The Court's language demonstrates that the
Court plainly was delaying a property owner's entry into the federal courthouse, not barring it.");
Thomas E. Roberts, Fifth Amendment Takings Claims in FederalCourt: The State Compensation
Requirement and Principles ofRes Judicata, 24 URB. LAW. 479, 480, 486-87 (1992) ("Reliance on
the ripeness rationale . . . suggests to property owners that their complaints will be ripe and heard in
the federal courts after their state suits are over.") (internal citations omitted).
29. See, e.g., Palomar Mobilehome Park Ass'n v. City of San Marcos, 989 F.2d 362, 364-65
(9th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted) (upholding the district court's dismissal of action based on the
doctrine of res judicata); Fields v. Sarasota Manatee Airport Auth., 953 F.2d 1299, 1308 (11th Cir.
1992) (affirming the district court's dismissal of the takings claim); Peduto v. City of N. Wildwood,
878 F.2d 725, 727-29 (3d Cir. 1989) (citations omitted) (affirming the district court's dismissal of
the takings claim).
30. See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City of S.F., 545 U.S. 323, 347-48 (2005).
31. See Kathryn E. Kovacs, Accepting the Relegation of Takings Claims to State Courts: The
FederalCourts' Misguided Attempts to Avoid Preclusion Under Williamson County, 26 ECOLOGY
L. Q. 1, 2 (1999) (acknowledging that Williamson County "effectively bars plaintiffs from raising
federal takings claims in federal court").
32. See Williamson Cnty. Reg'1 Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473
U.S. 172, 194 97 (1985) (citations omitted).
33. See San Remo, 545 U.S. at 347-48.
34. Robert H. Freilich & Jason M. Divelbiss, The Public Interest is Vindicated City of
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 31 URB. LAW. 371, 387 (1999).
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The trap set by Williamson County has been subject to much criticism and
described even by some of its supporters-in unflattering terms. 35
Compounding the problem even further, however, is the Supreme Court's
subsequent decision in International College of Surgeons.36 In International
College ofSurgeons, the plaintiff filed two lawsuits in state court seeking review
of a municipal decision to designate its property as a historical landmark.3
Asserting federal question jurisdiction because the complaints raised several
constitutional challenges-including violations of the Due Process, Equal
Protection, and Takings Clauses the defendant removed the case to federal
district court. 38 Although the district court disposed of the claims, the Seventh
Circuit reversed and remanded to the state court on the basis that a proceeding to
review a state administrative decision was not a "civil action" for purposes of the
removal statute. 39
The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the "propriety of removal"
depends ultimately on the original jurisdiction of the federal court.40 If the case
could have been initiated in federal court, then removal is proper; otherwise, it is
not. The Court then suggested that the plaintiffs claims could have been filed
directly in federal court because its "state court complaints raised a number of
issues of federal law in the form of various federal constitutional challenges." 4 1
The plaintiffs claims thus arose under the U.S. Constitution and the district
court had original jurisdiction over them, notwithstanding the procedural vehicle
in which they were packaged.
The Court's decision in International College of Surgeons not only
complicates matters for a federal takings plaintiff, but it also defies reason if

35. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, Judicial Takings and State Takings, 21 WIDENER L.J. 811, 836
(citing San Remo, 545 U.S. at 337-38) (stating that the state litigation requirement has "Alice-inWonderland quality"); Freilich & Divelbiss, supra note 34, at 387 (describing the rule as "inherently
nonsensical and self- stultifying"); Timothy V. Kassouni, The Ripeness Doctrine and the Judicial
Relegation of ConstitutionallyProtectedProperty Rights, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 51 (1992) (labeling
the rule a "Kafkaesque maze"); Thomas E. Roberts, Ripeness and Forum Selection in Fifth
Amendment Takings Litigation, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 37, 71 (1995) (describing the
Williamson County requirement as "a fraud or hoax on landowners"); see also Berger & Kanner,
supra note 28, at 702-03 (collecting similar descriptions). The characterizations offered by some
lower courts have been equally uncomplimentary. See, e.g., Santini v. Conn. Hazardous Waste
Mgmt. Serv., 342 F.3d 118, 130 (2d Cir. 2003) (describing the rule as "ironic and unfair");
Kottschade v. City of Rochester, 319 F.3d 1038, 1041 (8th Cir. 2003) (describing the rule as
"anomalous"); Fields v. Sarasota Manatee Airport Auth., 953 F.2d 1299, 1307 n.8 (11th Cir. 1992)
(describing the rule as "odd"); Murphy v. Village of Plainfield, 918 F. Supp. 2d 753, 761 (N.D. Ill.
2013) (describing the rule as "draconian").
36. 522 U.S. 156 (1997).
37. Id. at 159-60.
38. Id. at 160-61.
39. Id. at 161-62 (citing Int'l Coll. of Surgeons v. City of Chicago, 91 F.3d 981, 994 (7th Cir.
1996), rev'd, 522 U.S. 156 (1997)).
40. Id. at 163 (citing Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); Franchise Tax
Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 8 (1983)).
41. Id. at 164.
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Williamson County was correct about ripeness. Under International College of
Surgeons, a defendant may remove a claim that it has taken property in violation
of the Constitution because, ostensibly, the plaintiff could have initiated that
claim directly in federal district court.42 Under Williamson County, however, the
plaintiffs claim is unripe, and therefore cannot be pursued in federal court until
compensation has first been sought through litigation in state court.43 As one
federal court explained, the two decisions directly contradict one another:
"Either [International College of Surgeons] erroneously permitted removal, or
[International College of Surgeons] implicitly held that the regulatory takings
claim was ripe-a sub silentio elimination of the Williamson County State
Litigation prong."44
Even so, the Supreme Court has not resolved the conflict between these two
cases, leading to the bizarre result that takings plaintiffs cannot invoke federal
jurisdiction, but takings defendants can. And those defendants have not been shy
in utilizing the power given to them. Recognizing the tension between
International College of Surgeons and Williamson County, governmental
defendants routinely seek to remove takings claims filed in state court, only to
then seek dismissal of those same claims in federal court on the grounds that the
plaintiff failed to ripen them.45 The combined effect of International College of
Surgeons and Williamson County presents a formidable snare to litigants who
believe their property has been taken without just compensation. In addition to
effectively foreclosing access to a federal forum for takings plaintiffs, these
cases also subject the plaintiffs to a "judicial ping-pong game" of costly delays
and procedural gamesmanship. 46
III. SANSOTTA AND ToLoczKo
A.

Factualand ProceduralBackground

It is against this backdrop that a panel of the Fourth Circuit recently decided
the cases of Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head4 and Town of Nags Head v.

42. Id.
43. See Williamson Cnty. Reg'1 Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473
U.S. 172, 186 (1985).
44. Del-Prairie Stock Farm, Inc. v. Cnty. of Walworth, 572 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1033 (E.D.
Wis. 2008) (emphasis added).
45. See, e.g., Snaza v. City of St. Paul, 548 F.3d 1178, 1182 (8th Cir. 2008) (affirming
dismissal of a takings claim removed by the defendant); Vigilante v. Village of Wilmette, 88 F.
Supp. 2d 888, 890 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (dismissing the removed takings claim for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction); Rau v. City of Garden Plain, 76 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1176 77 (D. Kan. 1999) (dismissing
a takings claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction following the defendant's removal to federal
court); Seiler v. Charter Twp. of Northville, 53 F. Supp. 2d 957, 962 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (dismissing
the plaintiffs takings claim as unripe subsequent to removal).
46. Berger & Kanner, supra note 28, at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted).
47. 724 F.3d 533 (4th Cir. 2013).
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Toloczko. 48 Both cases arose from similar facts related to a tropical storm that
damaged several beachfront cottages in Nags Head, North Carolina. 49 After the
storm, the town notified several property owners that their cottages were being
declared as nuisances under a local ordinance that allowed such a declaration for
any structure located in a public trust area.o Pursuant to the ordinance, the only
method of abating the nuisances was to demolish the offending structures, and
the town began imposing daily fines against the owners until such demolition
occurred."
Several cottage owners challenged the town's nuisance declarations on the
grounds that they amounted to regulatory takings under federal law and inverse
52
condemnations under state law. In Sansotta, the cottage owners asserted these
claims in a state court action that was subsequently removed to federal district
court by the town.53 In Toloczko, by contrast, the town itself initiated state court
proceedings, and the defendant owners removed the case on the basis of
54
diversity of citizenship.
After removal, the owners filed numerous
counterclaims against the town, including the takings and inverse condemnation
55
claims referenced above. In both cases, the district court dismissed the owners'
federal takings claims as unripe under Williamson County.56 And in both cases,
the Fourth Circuit reversed.
B.

The Fourth Circuit'sDecision in Sansotta

The court's analyses rested on two foundational propositions. First, the
court acknowledged that Williamson County normally renders a takings claim
unripe, unless the person asserting that claim has unsuccessfully sought
compensation in a state court proceeding.
Because both cases had been
removed to federal court before the state proceedings were completed, the
owners technically had not yet satisfied the Williamson County requirement.59
The court also acknowledged, however, that ripeness under Williamson County

48. 728 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2013).
49. Id. at 394; Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 537.
50. Toloczko, 728 F.3d at 394; Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 537-38 (citing Town of Nags Head,
N.C., Code of Ordinances, § 16-31(6)(c) (2007)).
51. Toloczko, 728 F.3d at 394; Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 537 38.
52. Toloczko, 728 F.3d at 394; Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 538.
53. Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 538.
54. Toloczko, 728 F.3d at 394. In the state court action, the town sought to collect the fines
assessed against the cottage owners, as well as to require them to raze the cottage. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 394 n.4; Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 539.
57. Toloczko, 728 F.3d at 399; Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 549.
58. Toloczko, 728 F.3d at 399; Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 544 (citing Williamson Cnty. Reg'1
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 194-95 (1985)).
59. Toloczko, 728 F.3d at 394; Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 544.
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involves "only prudential considerations." 60 It is not a jurisdictional rule and, for
that reason, it does not bar a federal court from hearing a takings case in all
circumstances. 61 The question under Williamson County, then, was not whether
a federal court can adjudicate a takings claim, but whether it should do so in the
context of the case before it. 62
The Fourth Circuit answered that question affirmatively in Sansotta, in
which the town's removal of the case had ended the state litigation
prematurely.63 The court explained that Williamson County's state litigation
requirement was rooted in the comparatively better experience that state
tribunals have in resolving zoning and land use disputes. 4 By removing a
takings claim to federal court, however, a defendant tacitly agrees that the
federal courts can handle those claims, thereby foregoing any benefit that state
court expertise might otherwise offer.65 In short, when a government defendant
removes a takings claim, "the primary reason for the Williamson County statelitigation requirement no longer applies."66

In addition, general principles of fair play counseled against imposing the
state litigation requirement in these types of cases.67 The Fourth Circuit
analogized to a situation in which a removing state defendant seeks dismissal on
the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity. In such cases, the Supreme Court
has made clear that voluntary removal to federal court waives the state's
immunity from federal suit, regardless of the state's motivation for initiating the
69
removal.
One of the chief reasons underlying that rule is to prevent "unfair
tactical advantages"0 that lead to "seriously unfair results." 1 The Fourth Circuit
saw no difference between the Eleventh Amendment context and that at issue
under Williamson County:
Like Eleventh Amendment immunity, a state or its political subdivision
is entitled to assert the state-litigation requirement when a plaintiff files
suit in federal court. But permitting a state or its political subdivision to

60. Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 545 (citing Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725,
734 (1997)).
61. Id. ("Because Williamson County is a prudential rather than a jurisdictional rule... we
still have the power to decide the case.").
62. See id. ("[W]e may determine that in some instances, the rule should not apply. . .
63. Id.
64. Id. (citing San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City of S.F., 545 U.S. 323, 347 (2005)).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 545-46 (citing Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613
(2002)).
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Lapides, 535 U.S. at 618-24 (citations omitted) (concluding that "removal is a
form of voluntary invocation of a federal court's jurisdiction sufficient to waive" a state's claim to
sovereign immunity).
70. Id. at 621.
71. Id. at 619.
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assert this requirement after the state or its political subdivision has
removed the case to federal court would allow the state or its political
subdivision to do in the context of the Takings Clause exactly what the
Supreme Court has declared to be improper in the context of the
Eleventh Amendment: invoke federal jurisdiction and then object to
federal jurisdiction.72
Because the situations were similar, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the
rules employed in each situation should also be similar. Doing so was not only
"logically and legally sound,"74 but had the advantage of protecting innocent
plaintiffs; preventing manipulation by government defendants; and furthering the
"strong preference for deciding cases on the merits," rather than on the basis of
"procedural gamesmanship."
For these reasons, the Fourth Circuit held that
the town waived Williamson County's state litigation requirement by removing
the case to federal court.76
C. The Fourth Circuit'sDecision in Toloczko
As in Sansotta, the Toloczko case was removed from state court before the
cottage owners obtained an adjudication of their inverse condemnation claim.
Indeed, that claim was apparently never even raised before the state court, and
was only added after the owners removed the case to federal court.
Accordingly, the failure to satisfy the state litigation requirement lay squarely
with the owners-and not the government distinguishing the case from
Sansotta.79 The Fourth Circuit explained that "[w]here a plaintiffs failure to
satisfy Williamson County results from their [sic] own litigation strategy, rather
than
the
defendant's
'procedural
gamesmanship'
or
forum
manipulation,... Sansotta'swaiver principle does not apply."80
Even so, as in Sansotta, the court again noted that the state litigation
requirement is prudential rather than jurisdictional." For this reason, it was
within the court's discretion to hear the case, notwithstanding that the state
litigation requirement had not been met.82 The court explained that exercising
such discretion and suspending the requirement was especially proper "to avoid

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 546.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 546-47 (citing Heyman v. M.L. Mktg. Co., 116 F.3d 91, 94 (4th Cir. 1997)).
Id at 544.
Town of Nags Head v. Toloczko, 728 F.3d 391, 394 (4th Cir. 2013).
Id. (stating that owners' counterclaims were filed after removal).
Id. at 399 (citing Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 545-56).
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. (citing Sansotta, 724 F.3d 545).
Id.
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piecemeal litigation or otherwise unfair procedures." 83 Although the court did
not elaborate beyond stating that it would "not impose further rounds of
litigation on the" cottage owners, it concluded that "the interests of fairness and
judicial economy" warranted suspension of the state litigation requirement in the
present case.84
IV.

ANALYSIS

Read together, the Fourth Circuit's decisions in Sansotta and Toloczko
weaken the ripeness trap established by Williamson County and its progeny, and
help to reduce some of the procedural arbitrariness-and resulting inequitiesassociated with federal takings litigation. Under the rule from Sansotta,
government defendants accused of violating the Takings Clause will no longer
be able to leverage the state litigation requirement in cases that they voluntarily
remove to federal court.85 Moreover, the holding in Toloczko suggests that,
despite the state litigation requirement, there are at least some circumstances in
which a takings plaintiff may successfully invoke a federal forum as well.8 6
These holdings, and the reasoning that underlies them, raise at least two
broader implications. First, the decisions highlight that the state litigation
requirement of Williamson County really has nothing whatsoever to do with
Second, the decisions force an
ripeness as that term is generally understood.
evaluation of the proffered reasons why challenges based on the Takings Clause
deserve to be treated differently from other constitutional claims.88
A.

The State LitigationRequirement andRipeness

As an initial matter, Sansotta and Toloczko demonstrate that the state
litigation requirement is not grounded in ripeness, despite Williamson County's
statements to the contrary. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly explained,
ripeness is typically associated not only with prudential concerns, but also with
constitutional limitations on the power of the federal courts. 89 Because ripeness

83. Id. (quoting San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City of S.F., 545 U.S. 323, 346 (2005)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
84. Id. The concerns about judicial economy and piecemeal litigation no doubt arose from
the fact that the plaintiffs had raised several other constitutional challenges from which the district
court had erroneously abstained and, therefore, would be heard by the district court on remand. See
id at 395-98 (citations omitted).
85. See Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 544.
86. See Toloczko, 728 F.3d at 398-99 (citations omitted).
87. See Sansotta, 724 F.3d 533; Toloczko, 728 F.3d 391.
88. See Sansotta, 724 F.3d 533; Toloczko, 728 F.3d 391.
89. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 670 n.2 (2010)
("Ripeness reflects constitutional considerations that implicate Article III limitations on judicial
power, as well as prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction." (quoting Reno v. Catholic
Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993))) (internal quotation marks omitted); Renne v. Geary,
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is frequently considered a part of the Article III "case or controversy"
requirement,90 a ripeness challenge raises questions about the court's
jurisdictional power to hear a case in the first instance. 91
Notwithstanding the views of some other courts, the Fourth Circuit
highlighted in Sansotta and Toloczko that jurisdictional concerns are not the
basis for the state litigation requirement. 93 As the Supreme Court recently made
clear, under the Takings Clause, a case or controversy "exists once the
government has taken private property without paying for it." 94 Importantly, in
most cases, the "government" will be the state or local agency doing the alleged
taking.95 The state judicial system, by contrast, provides a forum to remedy the
uncompensated taking, just like a federal court does. In the words of one
commentator:
The real issue is whether the local entity is alleged to have taken private
property for public use and failed to pay for it. If so, the question
whether the city can be compelled to pay lies at the heart of litigation in
either state or federal court. As both have jurisdiction to decide federal
constitutional questions, the plaintiff may logically file in either. 96
So long as the plaintiff alleges that a governmental action has effected a taking
of its property without payment, subject matter jurisdiction exists and a federal
court has the constitutional authority to consider the case-regardless of whether
the plaintiff has sought relief in state court.97

501 U.S. 312, 316 (1991) ("Concerns of justiciability go to the power of the federal courts to
entertain disputes, and to the wisdom of their doing so.").
90. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (listing ripeness as one of "the
doctrines that cluster about Article III" (quoting Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1178-79
(D.D.C. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring))).
91. See, e.g., Williamson Cnty. Reg'1 Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,
473 U.S. 172, 197 (1985) (concluding that the takings claim could not be heard because it was
unripe).
92. See, e.g., Reahard v. Lee Cnty., 30 F.3d 1412, 1415 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that "the
question of ripeness goes to whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction" (quoting
Greenbriar Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 (11th Cir. 1989))) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
93. See Sansotta, 724 F.3d 533; Toloczko, 728 F.3d 391.
94. Home v. Dep't of Agric., 133 S. Ct. 2053, 2062 n.6 (2013).
95. See, e.g., Toloczko, 728 F.3d 391; cf Michael B. Kent, Jr., More Questions Than
Answers: Situating Judicial Takings Within Existing Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 29 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 143, 150-51 (2011) (noting that most Supreme Court takings cases involve actions by the
executive or legislative branches of government). But see Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v.
Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 713-16 (2010) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted)
(suggesting that the judicial branch can also take property under certain circumstances).
96. Berger & Kanner, supra note 28, at 694.
97. See Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2062 n.6. To the extent the Williamson County Court suggested
that no constitutional violation occurs if compensation can be obtained through a subsequent state
inverse condemnation proceeding, it was simply incorrect. Two years after Williamson County, the
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This conclusion is bolstered by the Supreme Court's holding in International
College of Surgeons.98 Indeed, it is the only sensible way to read that decision.
As noted above, International College of Surgeons allowed a defendant to
remove a takings claim on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. 99
Accordingly, the requirement that plaintiffs first seek and be denied redress in
state court cannot depend on jurisdictional limitations-"jurisdiction cannot
magically appear out of thin air merely because a municipal defendant thinks it
would be advantageous in a particular controversy."o10
If a takings claim
presents a federal question for purposes of removal, it equally does so for
purposes of initiating a civil action.101 Thus, the Fourth Circuit correctly
concluded in Sansotta and Tolozcko that the ripeness at issue in the state
litigation requirement is not rooted in any limitations imposed by Article III.102
At the same time, these decisions hint at the absence of another
characteristic typically associated with ripeness: that an unripe claim might
possibly mature.103
Even when ripeness rests solely on prudential
considerations, the prospect remains that the claim might still be heard by the
federal court at some point in the future. 104 As the Second Circuit explained,
"when a court declares that a case is not prudentially ripe, it means that the case
will be better decided later."
But this is untrue in the context of the state
litigation requirement because the case is over once the state court rules on the
plaintiffs request for compensation. As explained earlier, the federal courts
must give preclusive effect to the state court decision.106 In that regard, forcing a

Supreme Court indicated that a taking occurs at the time the government interferes with the
property, regardless of whether that interference is remedied or terminated at some subsequent
point. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. L.A. Cnty., 482 U.S. 304,
318-20 (1987) (citations omitted) (discussing "temporary" takings). As another commentator
recently explained, "the availability of a post-deprivation process has nothing to do with ripeness; it
has to do with remedies." See Joshua D. Hawley, The Beginning of the End? Home v. Department
of Agriculture and the Future of Williamson County, 2012-2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 245, 246-48
(2013) (discussing Williamson County's jurisdictional test as a break from the prior understanding
of takings law).
98. See City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 164 (1997).
99. See id.
100. Berger & Kanner, supra note 28, at 682.
101. See Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 163 ("The propriety of removal . . . depends on
whether the case originally could have been filed in federal court.").
102. See Town of Nags Head v. Toloczko, 728 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2013) (citations
omitted); Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 724 F.3d 533, 545 (4th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
103. See, e.g., Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of City of N.Y., 492 F.3d 89, 111 (2d
Cir. 2007) (Leval, J. concurring) ("The concept of ripeness assumes that the relationship between
the parties might at some point ripen. . . ."); see also Blanchette v. Conn. Gen. Ins. Corps., 419 U.S.
102, 139-40 (1974) (stating that "ripeness is peculiarly a question of timing" and concluding that
the posture of the case matured).
104. Simmonds v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 326 F.3d 351, 357 (2d Cir. 2003)
(discussing the prudential ripeness doctrine).
105. Id.
106. See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City of S.F., 545 U.S. 323, 337 38 (2005) (citing England v.
La. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411, 419 (1964)).
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plaintiff to first litigate the takings claim in state court is not a determination that
the case could thereafter be more "fit" for federal review. On the contrary, the
requirement is an effective foreclosure of the federal forum altogether. 107
The state litigation requirement, therefore, bears none of the usual hallmarks
of ripeness. Instead, the requirement looks more like some type of quasiabstention doctrine,108 something that was also suggested by the Fourth Circuit's
opinions in Sansotta and Toloczko. 109 Recall that, in Sansotta, the court
explained that the primary reason for the state litigation requirement is the
comparative expertise of state courts in resolving land use controversies.1 10
Commentators have likewise defended Williamson County "on the ground that
state courts have greater relevant local knowledge in land use matters, and
federal courts should avoid entanglement in quintessentially local disputes." 11
Thus, once ripeness justifications are jettisoned, Williamson County seems to rest
on federalism concerns and "the tensions inherent in a system that contemplates
parallel judicial processes."11 2 Given that these principles are the very same
principles that underlie the cases permitting federal courts to abstain in favor of a
state forum, abstention provides a better-albeit imperfect-description of what
Williamson County is about. 113

107. See id. (holding that the adjudication of a takings claim in state court has preclusive
effect).
108. Admittedly, the state litigation requirement does not precisely match the characteristics of
abstention either. First, the decision to abstain typically lies within the discretion of the court,
whereas the state litigation requirement is structured more as a directive. Compare R.R. Comm'n of
Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (rooting abstention in the exercise of "wise
discretion" by federal court), with Williamson Cnty. Reg'1 Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 200 (1985) (reversing lower courts' decisions on the merits and
remanding the case as "premature"). The Fourth Circuit's indication that a federal court can
suspend the state litigation requirement, however, diminishes this difference to some extent. See
Town of Nags Head v. Toloczko, 728 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2013) (suspending the state-litigation
requirement in the "interests of fairness and judicial economy"). Second, under Williamson County,
the federal court typically dismisses or remands a federal takings claim, whereas the power to do so
under abstention principles is limited to cases in which "the relief being sought is equitable or
otherwise discretionary." Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 731 (1996). For cases
seeking damages or compensation, the proper method of abstaining is to stay the federal proceeding
and await the outcome of the state suit. See id. (reversing the district court's remand order as an
"unwarranted application of the Burford doctrine" in damages action) (emphasis added). Despite
these differences, however, abstention principles provide a better explanation of the rule in
Williamson County than is provided by the ripeness doctrine.
109. See Toloczko, 728 F.3d at 395 99 (citations omitted); Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head,
724 F.3d 533, 544-48 (4th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
110. Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 545 (citing San Remo Hotel, L.P., 545 U.S. at 347)).
111. John D. Echeverria, Home v. Department of Agriculture: An Invitation to Reexamine
"Ripeness" Doctrine in Takings Litigation, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10735, 10744
(2013).
112. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 n.9 (1987) (referring to the various types of
abstention).
113. See, e.g., Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 723 ("Federal courts abstain out of deference to the
paramount interests of another sovereign, and the concern is with principles of comity and
federalism.").
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TreatingTakings Claims Differently

Viewing the state litigation requirement in this way, however, raises another
question: Why should the localized context in which takings claims arise
necessarily relegate them to a state forum? Although it is true that state courts
are generally more familiar with land use issues than federal courts, 114 it is not
entirely clear why that familiarity should matter. Other constitutional claims
frequently involve localized circumstances with which state courts may be more
familiar, but their comparatively better knowledge does not bar access to a
115
federal forum.
Indeed, this is true even in the land use context itself where the
challenge arises under some other provision of the Constitution. 116
Perhaps the strongest argument for giving state courts primary responsibility
over takings claims derives from the distinctive manner in which those claims
arise and the issues that must be evaluated in resolving them. For example,
whether a taking has occurred depends, at bottom, on the definition of property
and its characteristics-questions that are within the province of state, rather
than federal, authority.11 Analyzing a takings claim thus "requires a thorough
grounding in background state law," which makes these claims different from
most other constitutional challenges.118 Because takings claims present a unique
amalgam of state and federal law, the argument goes, federal courts should be
wary about proceeding too swiftly in matters that might intrude on state
prerogatives. 119
Although it is not the aim of this Essay to provide a full exposition of this
issue, the argument just presented certainly has some merit. Nonetheless, it is
important to remember that takings claims are an amalgam of state andfederal
law.
Because the rights protected by the Takings Clause are federal
constitutional rights, the states' primacy over property law must be considered in
light of these rights. Although ensuring against a constitutional violation will,
therefore, necessarily mean that state law-and deference to it-must yield on
occasion, this is true of other constitutional rights as well, including other areas
in which state property law is central. 120

114. See, e.g., Echeverria,supra note 111, at 10744; San Remo Hotel, L.P., 545 U.S. at 347.
115. See McConnell, supra note 10, at 10751 (using as examples "First Amendment claims
brought by municipal employees when they are disciplined for speaking out in ways that may or
may not be relevant to their jobs and claims of 'exigent circumstances' for warrantless searches").
116. See San Remo Hotel, L.P., 545 U.S. at 350-51 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (noting that
First Amendment and Equal Protection challenges to land use ordinances may proceed directly in
federal court).
117. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 707
(2010) ("Generally speaking, state law defines property interests .
(citing Phillips v. Wash.
Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998))).
118. Stewart E. Sterk, The Demise of FederalTakings Litigation, 48 WM. & NLRY L. REV.
251, 288-89 (2006).
119. See id. at 292.
120. See id. at 290; see also Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 726 ("[F]ederal courts
must often decide what state property rights exist in nontakings contexts . . . .").
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Consider procedural due process challenges, for example. The first step in
proving a denial of procedural due process based on a deprivation of property
involves demonstrating that the plaintiff had property in the first place.
To
determine whether a plaintiff successfully can establish a property right naturally
requires an evaluation of state property law, and this task frequently entails
navigating the legal and factual complexities related to local land use
regulations.122 Additionally, as one might expect, state and federal courts
sometimes disagree as to whether property exists to support a procedural due
process claim. 123 But there is no suggestion that federal courts should abstain
from hearing these types of challenges or that cases involving them are somehow
suited for resolution exclusively in a state forum.
Williamson County's state litigation requirement as well as the ripeness
trap that it establishes thus presents an incongruity between takings claims and
other areas of constitutional litigation, including other areas dependent on state
property law principles. While thoughtful arguments for relegating takings
challenges to state courts have been made, it is not clear why those arguments
should apply to such challenges only. The recognition that takings claims are
treated differently often for unclear or unconvincing reasons has led to calls
that they be "normalized."l24 In a recent article, Michael McConnell has defined
the term normalization to mean "treating Takings Clause claims as normal
constitutional claims, subject to the same procedural, jurisdictional, and remedial
principles that apply to other constitutional rights."1 25 Moreover, Professor
McConnell sees a pattern in several recent Supreme Court decisions that he
believes begin the process of doing just that "cut[ting] through the morass of
arbitrary, clause-specific rules, complications, and obstacles to relief that have
accrued over the past few decades."126
The Fourth Circuit's decisions in Sansotta and Toloczko are a part of this
trend.
By correctly noting that the state litigation requirement is not
jurisdictionally required, the Fourth Circuit affirmed that Takings Clause claims
can be heard in federal court, just like all other constitutional challenges. 127
Moreover, by twice expressing its confidence that federal courts could navigate

121. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972) (stating that
the purported interest must be within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of property); Sylvia
Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Cnty., 48 F.3d 810, 826 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that the appellant must
establish that it had a property interest to prove a denial of due process).
122. See Sylvia Dev. Corp., 48 F.3d at 826-27 (determining whether the plaintiff had a
property interest in context of a land use scheme by evaluating local ordinances).
123. See, e.g., Boreen v. Christensen, 884 P.2d 761, 767-69 (Mont. 1994) (citations omitted)
(disagreeing with federal courts' prior interpretations that state law did not create property interest
triggering procedural due process protections).
124. See McConnell, supra note 10, at 10749.
125. Id.
126. Id. (citing Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013); Home v.
Dep't of Agric., 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013); Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. Ct.
511 (2012)).
127. Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 724 F.3d 533, 545 (4th Cir. 2013).
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the state law principles underlying the plaintiffs' takings claims,12 the court
suggested in Sansotta that the principal justification for the state litigation
requirement was not overly persuasive.129 Sansotta's holding that government
defendants may not seek dismissal of cases they voluntarily removed30 also
eliminates an anomalous and lop-sided advantage frequently used against
property owners in takings litigation. Finally, although its application seems
narrow, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Toloczko to waive the state litigation
requirement in a case removed by the plaintiffsl31 holds open the possibility that
future takings plaintiffs, at least in the Fourth Circuit, might be able to invoke a
federal forum directly. 132
V.

CONCLUSION

Williamson County's state litigation requirement sets a trap for unwary
property owners who believe that a state or local entity has taken their property
in violation of the Takings Clause. As applied by most federal courts, this trap
effectively denies owners a federal forum in which to litigate their claims and
permits the entities accused of the constitutional violation to force upon the
owners undue costs and delays. The Fourth Circuit's recent decisions in
Sansotta and Toloczko weaken this trap considerably and, in the process,
highlight the real nature of the state litigation requirement, while simultaneously
questioning the reasons that underlie it. In this way, these decisions are part of a
larger trend toward normalizing takings litigation. While the Sansotta and
Toloczko cases go a long way toward accomplishing this normalization, they also
reveal the need for the Supreme Court to revisit and clarify the ripeness rules
applicable to regulatory takings claims.

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 545, 549.
See id.
Id. at 549.
Town of Nags Head v. Toloczko, 728 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2013).
See id.

